

APPEAL NO. 040643
FILED MAY 3, 2004

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on February 19, 2004. The hearing officer determined that: (1) the appellant's (claimant) compensable injury does not extend to and include reflex sympathetic dystrophy/chronic regional pain syndrome (RSD/CRPS); and (2) the claimant is not entitled to supplemental income benefits (SIBs) for the fifth and sixth quarters. The claimant appeals these determinations on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. The respondent (carrier) urges affirmance.

DECISION

Affirmed.

EXTENT OF INJURY

The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant's compensable injury does not extend to and include RSD/CRPS. This determination involved a question of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)) and, as the trier of fact, resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence, including the medical evidence (Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ)). There was conflicting medical evidence presented, and we cannot conclude that the hearing officer's determination is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).

SIBs

The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant is not entitled to fifth and sixth quarter SIBs. Section 408.142 and Tex. W.C. Comm'n, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 130.102 (Rule 130.102) establish the requirements for entitlement to SIBs. At issue is whether the claimant had no ability to work during the qualifying periods, thereby satisfying the good faith requirements of Section 408.142(a)(4) and Rule 130.102(d)(4). It was for the hearing officer, as the trier of fact, to resolve the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and to determine what facts had been established. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). In view of the applicable law and the evidence presented, we cannot conclude that the hearing officer's determinations are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Cain, *supra*.

We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.**

Michael B. McShane
Appeals Panel
Manager/Judge

CONCUR:

Elaine M. Chaney
Appeals Judge

Chris Cowan
Appeals Judge